Franklin Pierce wasn’t high on my interest list of presidents to read about for this America @ 250 project until I learned that he was intimate friends with Jefferson Davis and his wife Varina. Pierce and Davis served together in the Army, then in high office, and shared the awful burden of having lost children. In Pierce’s case, he lost three, and then he effectively lost his country: because he would not denounce his friend Jeff Davis during the War, he himself was treated as a pariah and spent his last years a recluse, abused socially whenever he ventured out. I found this premise completely captivating, almost like a tragic novel, and wanted to learn more about the man. Franklin Pierce by Michael F. Holt offers a little insight, but it is not for the faint of heart, digging deeply into party politics. That is not an accident, because Pierce’s compromises to keep the Democratic party intact would backfire mightily, leading to a split ticket that allowed for the triumph of the Republicans at the polls — and the death of the early Republic as it splintered into civil war and emerged a new, bloody creature. If, however, your interest is in the crackup of the Democratic party and the road to Civil War, this will prove a short but detailed read.
There are surely fewer figures in American history who have experienced the kind of rise and fall exhibited by Franklin Pierce. The son of a prominent figure, young Frank rose swiftly in New Hampshire politics within a new and cohesive Democratic party: he was ensconced within the state legislature in his twenties, and continued to rise through the ranks, stopping only to fight in the Mexican war where he did not especially distinguish himself, being roughly treated by his own horse. While he earned no soldiers’ kudos, he was seen as a safe bet in the Democratic party of the late ’40s and early ’50s — everyone liked Frank. He looked dashing, he was hard working and well spoken, and despite being almost as far North as you can get, he had a steady affection for the South and a good base of support there. What could go wrong?
Well…Kansas. And Nebraska. The Kansas-Nebraska act, to be specific. The question of slavery had plagued the American union from its birth: the Founding generation resolved to table it for a few decades, knowing they needed to come together to throw off the yoke of Parliament and its taxes, but bad policies do not improve with age any more than bad news does. The Founding generation had the luxury of believing slavery was dying out on its own: they did not anticipate that the cotton gin would give it new life, nor that succeeding generations of Southerners, constantly attacked for how prominent slavery was within their society, would make its defense an article of faith rather than a necessary evil. As the borders of the Union continued to drift further west — hastened by purchases of land and that little Mexican dustup — sectional strife increased. Southerners were adamant that the possibility of slavery exist out west, even if the land was too barren to permit heavy agriculture, or if the locals — in the case of the upper west — didn’t want to allow blacks at all. Some peace was achieved by the Missouri compromise, but then the Kansas-Nebraska act stirred the kettle all over again by insisting that whether states be slave or free depended entirely on the people who lived there. While this sounded ‘democratic’, it was a compromise in the truest sense: it forced everyone to live by lies, to an extent. There was no sense at all in a man’s state in life depending on where he happened to live: if a man was a man and not some ‘pygmy’ as the most ardent slavers held, that could not possibly vary on invisible lines drawn on a map. Pierce, however, insisted in good limited-government fashion that it made perfect sense for the people of each State to decide on this matter, and he shifted his appointments within the spoils system to force recalcitrant Democrats on either side to step in line. While they did at first, they did not do so for long — and the result was an implosion for the Democratic party, one that was delayed enough to allow for the election of President Buchanan but then happened with such thoroughness that Democrats did not achieve the high office again until Grover Cleveland two decades later. With Kansas dissolving into a miniature civil war — complete with rival legislatures and John Brown murdering people simply for acknowledging one or the other — Pierce’s lack of active leadership, his retiring in the field of combat, led to punishing results at the polls.
This was…a difficult book to summarize. I was interested in Pierce’s role in the road to secession, of course, and that I got in spades — but little else. Pierce’s intimate relationship with the Davises is never mentioned at all: instead, we get a notion of a man who let the perfect become the enemy of the good, and made wide the road to secession and war by maintaining that it was not his place to interfere. Perhaps it was not, from his view of someone who had a constrained vision of the executive we lost only when Lincoln and others turned the presidency into an elective monarchy. Still, with the hindsight of history it is hard to wish he and his successor Buchanan did not do more. I will read more of Mr. Pierce, either directly (The Expatriation of Franklin Pierce) or through his presence in other volumes. And I suspect I will read more of Mr. Holt, given that he has an entire book on the rise and fall of the Whigs.
Quotations
A crucial facet of nineteenth-century political life can help the modern reader understand how this could happen. After all, today’s major parties, the Democrats and Republicans, appear almost invulnerable to challenges from new parties. But that invulnerability is largely attributable to the fact that state governments print the ballots voters cast, punch, or mark, and the same governments control the access that parties have to those publicly printed ballots. Thus challengers to the major parties must jump through hoops, usually by collecting signatures on petitions, to get on the ballot so that people might have a chance to vote for them. In the nineteenth century, however, governments did not print and distribute ballots. That was the job of the political parties themselves. In effect, this system meant that all that was needed to launch a new party was access to printing presses and enough volunteer manpower to distribute its ballots at the polls. That was the scenario in the extraordinarily tumultuous elections of 1854—55 in which the northern electorate repudiated Pierce’s party.
The Barnburners, who had supported Van Buren’s candidacy in 1848 and who constituted a clear majority of the party, were now led by John A. Dix. The Soft-Shell Hunkers, who had supported Cass in 1848 and had welcomed the Barnburners back to the Democratic fold in 1849, were led by William L. Marcy, whom Pierce had named to the top post in his cabinet. Finally, the Hard-Shell Hunkers were led by former senator Daniel S. Dickinson and insisted that Barnburner rebels be denied any elective or appointive office. “
After denouncing slavery as “a relic of barbarism,” calling for renewed defiance of the Fugitive Slave Act, and insisting that Congress prohibit slavery extension to check the “unequal representation” of the South in Washington, D.C., [the nascent Republican Party] declared that the purpose of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was to “give the Slave States such a decided and practical preponderance in all measures of government as shall reduce the North . . . to the mere province of a few slaveholding oligarchs of the South—to a condition too shameful to be contemplated.” The party’s platform concluded: “That in view of the necessity of battling for the first principles of republican government, and against the schemes of aristocracy the most revolting and oppressive with which the earth was ever cursed, or man debased, we will co-operate and be known as Republicans until the contest be terminated.” In short, the mission of the Republican Party was less opposition to slavery than opposition to southern slaveholders, and this would be the primary theme of Republican campaigners until the Civil War.
No blood had been shed during the Sack of Lawrence, but a few nights later, apparently in retaliation for this raid, the anti-slavery fanatic John Brown and his sons butchered five innocent settlers along Pottawatomie Creek in Franklin County, Kansas. Not one of the victims owned slaves; their offense was that they paid fealty to the official territorial legislature..
What pushed Pierce over the edge was the arrest and prosecution by military tribunal in the spring of 1863 of the Ohio Peace Democrat Clement L. Vallandigham for calling the war a failure—an arrest and prosecution that Lincoln defended. For Pierce, this violation of fundamental civil liberty was too much; hence he agreed to be the keynote speaker at a mass Democratic rally in Concord, New Hampshire, on July 4, 1863. Addressing some twenty-five thousand people, Pierce issued a passionate defense of the right of free speech. “Who,” he asked, “has clothed the President with power to dictate to any of us when we may or must speak, or be silent, and especially in relation to the conduct of any public servant? By what right does he presume to prescribe a formula of language for your lips or mine?” Then Pierce took a step too far. Like Vallandigham, he described the Union’s war effort as “fearful, fruitless, [and] fateful.” A reliance on armed force, he averred, could never produce peace.







